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Abstract 
Four studies show that moral identity reduces people’s aversion to giving time—
particularly as the psychological costs of giving time increase. In study 1, we demonstrate that 
even when the cost of time and money are held equivalent, a moral cue enhances the expected 
self-expressivity of giving time—especially when it is given to a moral cause. We found that a 
moral cue reduces time aversion even when giving time was perceived to be unpleasant (study 
2), or when the time to be given was otherwise seen to be scarce (study 3). Study 4 builds on 
these studies by examining actual giving while accounting for the real costs of time. In this study 
we found that the chronic salience of moral identity serves as a buffer to time aversion, 
specifically as giving time becomes increasingly costly. These findings are discussed in terms of 
the time vs. money literature and the identity literature. We also discuss policy implications for 
prosocial cause initiatives. 
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“The best way to find yourself is to lose yourself in service to others.”  
–Mahatma Gandhi 
 
 “Waste your money and you're only out of money, but waste your time and you've lost a 
part of your life.” 
–Michael LeBoeuf  
 
“It is the nature of the strong heart….it strives ever upward, even when it is most 
burdened.” 
  –Phillip Sydney  
 
How do we determine whether to donate money or give time to prosocial causes? Money 
and time are valuable resources with different psychological properties (Mogilner, 2010; Okada 
& Hoch 2004).  While spending money has been shown to promote happiness (Dunn, Aknin, & 
Norton, 2008), especially when spent in particular ways (Dunn, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Aknin, 
Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton, 2011; Dunn & Norton, 2013), simply thinking about money leads 
to anti-social behaviors such as being more self-focused, less helpful and fair towards others, and 
less sensitive to social exclusion (Zho, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008; 
DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007).  By contrast, giving time to help others is also associated with distinctly 
prosocial outcomes. Giving time creates stronger interpersonal connections and other-focused 
behaviors (Mogilner, 2010; Liu & Aaker, 2008; Reed, Aquino & Levy 2007), leads to self-
reflection and a reduction in cheating behaviors (Gino & Mogilner, 2014), and boosts perceived 
time affluence and self-efficacy. Giving time enables us to commit to future engagements with 
greater confidence and enthusiasm (Mogilner, Chance & Norton 2012). As a result, giving time 
leads to happiness and well-being (Aaker, Rudd & Mogilner 2011) and as the first quote 
suggests, may indeed be one of the deepest ways one can self-actualize.  
Despite the benefits of giving time, it is associated with a number of perceived 
psychological costs. Compared to money, time is harder to account for and is less fungible (Saini 
& Monga, 2008; Zauberman & Lynch, 2005; Okada & Hoch, 2004). One can spend their time 
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doing lots of different things, but choosing what to do imposes a particular kind of opportunity 
cost by preventing them from doing other things. Although spending money also has opportunity 
costs, it is possible to exponentially increase one’s pool of money. However, since we are all 
mortal, everyone’s time is limited, and both the pauper and the billionaire are allotted the same 
24 hours in a day to do what it is they want. Importantly, as the second quote above suggests, 
once these hours are lost they cannot be recovered. Time and money also differ because even 
though people are generally willing to exchange money with just about anybody, time is a more 
particularistic resource (Foa & Foa 1980), meaning people are much more selective when 
deciding with whom to exchange it (Blieszner, 1993). The differences between time and money 
just described lead us to propose a psychological principle that influences the willingness to 
expend time versus money on social causes: namely, all else being equal, the psychological costs 
associated with giving time should make people less willing to give time than money in service 
to a social cause. We refer to this phenomenon as time aversion. By “social cause” we mean any 
activity that requires a person to expend time or money voluntarily to benefit others. We focus 
on time aversion in the contexts of social causes because, as we noted above, it is when giving 
time on behalf of others that people tend to reap a variety of psychological benefits. 
If indeed there are significant psychological benefits to giving time, yet a corresponding 
aversion to doing so, then time aversion may be a somewhat maladaptive psychological response 
– one with significant social consequences. An important question that emerges from this tension 
is: what factors lessen time aversion? Else put, what can be done to steer us away from this 
socio-psychological malady? In this paper we argue that “moral identity” (Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Reed & Aquino 2003)—either when primed or chronically salient—can play such a role. Our 
central premise is that moral identity can lessen time aversion because people behave in ways 
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that affirm and reinforce their identities. Accordingly, a strong moral identity may reduce time 
aversion not despite the higher cost of giving time but rather because of it. Put another way, 
giving time more strongly reinforces the moral self, compared to giving money (Reed, Aquino 
and Levy 2007). Therefore, like the third quote above suggests, moral identity may be one source 
of a strong heart, i.e., a powerful motivator that reduces time aversion, especially as doing so 
becomes more and more psychologically costly.  
We present four studies that show the effect of moral identity on reducing time aversion. 
In study 1, we demonstrate that even when the cost of time and money are held equivalent, a 
moral cue enhances the expected self-expressivity of giving time—especially when it is given to 
a moral cause. This suggests that even though giving time can in fact be costly, when people’s 
moral identities are salient they may come to perceive it as less so, thereby helping them 
overcome their time aversion. The next two studies were designed to be stronger tests of the 
effect of moral identity on time aversion. In both studies we directly manipulated the 
psychological costs of giving time and examined people’s self-reported preferences to give time 
(vs. money), as well as their expected reactions. We found that a moral cue reduces time 
aversion even when giving time was perceived to be unpleasant (study 2), or when the time to be 
given was otherwise seen to be scarce (study 3). Together, these two studies show that the effect 
of moral identity on time aversion is at least partially driven by an altered perception of the 
unpleasantness of time as well as an anticipated connection to those who receive the time. Study 
4 builds on these studies by examining actual giving while accounting for the real costs of time. 
In this study we found that the chronic salience of moral identity serves as a buffer to time 
aversion, especially as giving time becomes increasingly costly (i.e., scarce).  
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The main theoretical contribution of this article is that it connects the (a) time vs. money 
and (b) identity research streams, and shows how they complement and inform one another. 
While some prior work suggests that an activated moral identity may create greater self-reported 
preferences to give time over money (Reed et al., 2007), this article explores the boundary 
conditions of giving time under conditions in which doing so is particularly difficult. This 
contribution is important from both conceptual and practical perspectives. Conceptually, it 
enriches both the time vs. money and identity research streams by providing insights that neither 
could provide on its own. For instance, the time vs. money literature finds that time fosters 
greater interpersonal connection than money does (Mogilner, Chance & Norton, 2012; Mogilner 
2010), yet adding an understanding of how the act can and cannot reinforce an identity (Laverie, 
Kleine & Kleine, 2002) allows us to predict what might motivate people to overcome the 
psychological barriers to doing so. On the other hand, the identity literature argues that moral 
identity motivates people to connect with and help others (Reed & Aquino, 2003), yet adding 
time vs. money research allows us to better predict how people seek to connect: by giving time or 
money. Pragmatically speaking, donors, recipients, and society-at-large all benefit when people 
decide to give time, yet many people seem to have a strong aversion to this, especially as the 
costs of doing so increase. Thus, understanding how and what factors can overcome time 
aversion is an important research issue with real world import. 
This article proceeds as follows. First we describe our theoretical framework and review 
relevant background literature. Second, we present four studies that together demonstrate and 
provide evidence for the effect of moral identity on time aversion. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of future research directions and implications for practical issues such as persuasion 
for charitable organizations and public policy initiatives. 
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Theoretical Framework 
 Time is an Important Psychological Resource that People Are Averse to Giving: The time 
and money literature suggests that giving or just thinking about time (compared to giving money) 
has significant psychological benefits. For example, Mogilner et. al. (2012) found that when 
participants recalled a situation in which they spent time on others (compared to a condition in 
which they recalled spending time on themselves) they reported significantly higher reactions of 
feeling capable, competent and useful (Experiment 3, page 1236). Priming the concept of time 
makes people more self-reflective and reduces cheating behaviors (Gino & Mogilner, 2014). And 
because of its connection to forming meaningful experiences (Carter & Gilovich, 2010; Van 
Boven & Gilovich, 2003), giving time is closely associated with happiness and well-being 
(Mogilner, 2010). However, time is a particularistic resource with a unique opportunity cost 
associated with its finite supply (Reed & Aquino, 2003; Foa and Foa, 1974). This means that 
when it comes to giving time, the qualities of the person receiving the resource and the nature of 
the relationship between the giver and the receiver matters. As a result, people are more likely to 
spend time on close rather than distant others (Reed & Aquino, 2003; Blieszner, 1993). This may 
be one reason why simply priming the concept of time (compared to money) makes people more 
likely to plan to spend time with family and friends (Mogilner, 2010). It also makes them more 
likely to actually socialize instead of work (Mogilner, 2010; experiment 2 page 1352). Therefore, 
giving time imposes a kind of unique psychological cost in the sense that it demands some ability 
to relate to and care about the beneficiary. This is why we might be more miserly about giving 
time to strangers than money, especially as the perceived pace of life accelerates (Levine, 2008). 
Put another way, giving time is psychologically more demanding than giving money. Thus, as 
time is a unique and precious resource that once lost can never be recovered, people may have a 
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significant aversion to giving it away, especially to strangers or distant others (Reed & Aquino 
2003).  
People Are Less Time Averse when Giving Time Reinforces Identity: This article asks the 
question: what might help a person overcome time aversion — especially as the psychological 
costs of giving time increase? The answer may partially lie in the extent to which the act of 
giving time is or is not reflective of and rooted in a person’s identity. Research shows that both 
situational cues and individual differences can activate particular identities or aspects of the self 
(Reed, 2004). Once these identities are activated, people then seek to reinforce them through 
identity consistent behaviors (Oyserman, 2007). One of the reasons they do so is to affirm for 
themselves and express to others that they hold that identity. A study by Laverie, Kleine & 
Kleine (2002) found that an identity becomes more important to the self when “more 
opportunities exist to enact and receive feedback from others (social commitments),” and “more 
positive and self-enhancing feedback is experienced” (page 668). This independent appraisal 
mechanism is at least one way in which we determine if our behaviors are consistent with our 
identities, and one way in which we assess different kinds of behaviors that have the strongest 
ability to strengthen our self-image (Laverie et. al 2002; Kleine et. al 1993; Solomon 1983). It is 
well accepted that people have multiple identities (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 
2004). This begs the question: what identity might be reinforced by giving time to prosocial 
causes? In response to this question, this article places moral identity center stage. 
Moral Identity Reduces Time Aversion Even As The Cost of Time Increases: Broadly 
defined, morality is a meaning system of principles and values that determine what is right and 
wrong and what is good or bad conduct for an individual and or society. Definitions of morality 
can vary across different cultures (Graham, Meindl & Beall 2012)1, as well as the extent to 
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which an individual may ascribe these values to the moral dimensions of their own identity 
(Blasi, 1980). We define moral identity as a self-schema organized around a set of moral traits 
(e.g., fair, honest, kind) – traits that commonly come to people’s minds when they are asked 
what it means to be moral (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moral identity activation varies across 
situations. Consistent with trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003), situational cues can 
activate moral identity. This brings moral identity to the forefront of peoples’ minds and prompts 
them to act consistently with it (Finnel, Reed, & Aquino, 2011). In addition to being triggered by 
situational cues, the chronic salience of moral identity (how important this identity is to a 
person’s self-definition) varies across individuals (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The higher the 
chronic salience, the more easily moral identity is activated (see Higgins, 1996), and the more it 
motivates moral judgments and behaviors (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Thus, both situational cues 
and individual differences may trigger cognitions and behaviors that reflect compassion, 
kindness, and other traits associated with moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). As moral 
cognitions and behaviors lead people to seek human connection (Reed & Aquino, 2003), they 
may become more willing to spend time on strangers or distant others. Accordingly, this may 
reduce their default aversion to doing so. Hence, our central premise is that the subjective 
experience of a strong moral identity, whether this state is chronic or temporarily primed, can 
diminish time aversion because people are more likely to behave in ways that affirm and 
reinforce this identity. As a result, people are more likely to prefer giving time than money to a 
social cause precisely because it is more costly to give. Put another way, compared to giving 
money; giving time more strongly reinforces the moral self (Reed, Aquino and Levy 2007) 
because it requires a greater expenditure of effort and is a resource that, once given, cannot be 
taken back. We contend that costly sacrifices that are consistent with one’s commitment to a 
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given identity, in this case a moral one, will be more identity-reinforcing than less costly ones 
because it sends a stronger, more definitive signal to the self and others that this identity is 
experienced as being essential to one’s self-concept.    
The Effect of Moral Identity on Time Aversion Is Driven by Basic Human Needs: The 
effect of moral identity on time aversion is motivated by at least two basic human needs: (a) the 
need for self-expression; and (b) the need for human connection. Self-expressiveness is at least 
one answer to the question of why moral identity reduces time aversion. For instance, moral 
identity may drive people to show that they are moral individuals who are compassionate, kind, 
and so forth (Aquino and Reed 2002).2 But how will people seek to express their moral identity 
if they have many possible ways of doing so? People faced with two options (e.g., giving time or 
money) will be motivated via self-appraisal (Laverie, et. al. 2002) to determine which one 
provides the most potent form of self-expression. All things being equal, people will choose the 
option that best reflects their self-image. People implicitly know that giving time better reflects 
the traits associated with moral identity than donating money does. As a result, those with a 
stronger moral identity will be more likely to give time as opposed to money. It is simply a 
matter of choosing the option that best reflects their self-image. 
The need for human connection is another potential reason why moral identity reduces 
time aversion. Interpersonal connection is a fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995) that lies at the core of numerous theories of motivation (ie. Alderfer, 1969; McClelland, 
1961; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Giving time likely creates stronger interpersonal connections than 
donating money does. Moral identity has been shown to be an important motivational impetus to 
connect and help others in need (Reed, et. al., 2007), thereby facilitating interpersonal 
connection. Moral identity has been found to be associated with a stronger obligation to help not 
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only in-groups (e.g., friends and family) but also out-groups (e.g., strangers) (Reed & Aquino, 
2003). Since moral identity encourages people to connect with others (Reed & Aquino 2003), 
and since giving time is more connecting than donating money is, it may be that moral identity 
reduces time aversion and may be particularly likely to do so as the psychological costs of time 
increase. 
Summary of Predictions and Empirical Work 
To summarize, we expect moral identity – whether situationally activated or chronically 
accessible – to reduce time aversion. We test the effect of moral identity on time aversion via 
two main predictions. First, we predict that moral identity enhances the expected self-
expressivity of giving time as well as the anticipated connection with the recipient. Second, we 
predict that moral identity may reduce time aversion even as the psychological costs of giving 
time increase. We argue that it is precisely when giving time is costly that moral identity has its 
greatest effect on time aversion. That is, moral identity may reduce time aversion not in spite of 
the higher costs of giving time, but because of them (see Oyserman, 2007).  
  
STUDY 1: A MORAL CUE REDUCES AVERSION TO GIVING TIME 
BECAUSE GIVING TIME TO A MORAL CAUSE ALIGNS THE ACT WITH ONE’S 
IDENTITY 
Study Overview 
Study 1 tests an underlying core assumption of this article. The aversion to giving time 
can be reduced by moral identity—and that one reason this can happen is that giving time 
(compared to money) has inherently stronger self-expressive properties. This can potentially 
align moral identity with giving time. Therefore, we predict that people will expect the giving of 
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time to be more self-expressive especially when the time is allocated to a moral purpose and that 
this reduction in aversion to time is enhanced in the presence of a moral cue.  The study is a 2 
(Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Moral vs. Non-Moral Cause) between-subjects 
design. One hundred and sixty-eight panel members at a university behavioral lab (students, 
administrative staff, and local area community residents) (55 males, 113 females) completed 
three tasks: (1) a general opinion survey that measured impression management, (2) a 
handwriting task containing the moral identity activation manipulation, and (3) a hypothetical 
donation request capturing self-reported preferences to give time vs. money. After these and 
other unrelated tasks, participants were paid $10 and debriefed.  
Moral Identity Activation 
The moral identity activation manipulation was a writing task (see appendices for all 
measures and manipulations used in this article). The task’s purpose was purportedly “to 
examine people’s handwriting styles.” Participants received nine words, copied each one four 
times, and wrote a story about themselves that used each one at least once. In the moral identity 
activated condition, the words were traits that people commonly associate with being a moral 
person (Aquino and Reed 2002) (e.g, kind). In the moral identity not activated condition, the 
words were positive traits unrelated to morality (e.g., polite) (See Appendix A for this 
manipulation). After writing their story, respondents completed manipulation checks and 
questions that bolstered the cover story. The manipulation checks revealed that participants in the 
moral identity activated (not activated) condition thought their stories were more (less) reflective 
of how they saw themselves as moral people (MNotActivated = 4.68, MActivated = 5.40), F(1, 161) = 
6.26, p<.05, Partial η2 = .04. 
Hypothetical Donation Request 
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After the handwriting task, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated Hypothetical 
Donation Request. They were told that the American Marketing Association (AMA) wished to 
assess people’s perceptions of and desire to volunteer different kinds of resources for fundraising 
efforts. Participants read about a particular AMA fundraising effort, with the nature of the effort 
manipulated in the manner described below. Participants then completed the measures described 
below. 
Morality of the Cause. We manipulated the morality of the cause. In the moral cause 
condition, the AMA was purportedly developing a grassroots community campaign to raise 
awareness of the need for college students to get involved early in volunteer activities (e.g., 
promoting human rights). In the non-moral cause condition, the AMA was purportedly 
developing an advertisement and persuasive communication campaign to promote and sell 
marketing services to companies. Since aid recipients are relatively needier in the first case, we 
reasoned that the first cause would be perceived as relatively more moral (See Appendix B for 
this manipulation). Manipulation checks completed at the end of the study confirmed this: 
compared to participants in the non-moral cause condition, those in the moral cause condition 
believed their resources would be going to a more moral cause (MNonMoralCause = 2.40, MMoralCause 
= 3.78), F(1, 160) = 25.54, p<.001, Partial η2 = .13. 
Self-Expressiveness. Participants indicated how much they agreed (1 = Strongly Disagree, 
7 = Strongly Agree) with ten statements concerning the extent to which giving to the cause 
would be self-expressive (e.g., “Participating in this fundraising effort would reflect the type of 
person that I am.”) (α = .95). See Appendix C for this measure. 
Donation Preferences. Participants then imagined that they came to the lab one day and 
were given three options for aiding the cause: donate $5 (they would give $5 of their $10 
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compensation for the day’s session to the cause), donate $5 worth of their time (they had no pre-
existing obligations and would spend time after the session helping with mailings for the cause), 
or do neither. They then indicated what they would likely do (1 = “No Thanks! I prefer not to 
donate,” the midpoint = “Donate $5 in cash money,” and 10 = “Donate $5 worth of my time.”), 
such that larger numbers reflected a relatively higher preference for giving time vs. money.3 
Control Variables. We controlled for four variables (age, gender, religious participation, 
and impression management) that may influence preferences for giving time vs. money 
(Gilligan, 1982; Myers, 2000; Paulhus, 1989; Putnam, 2000; Reed et al., 2007). 
Results 
Self-Expressiveness. Table 1 shows means, standard deviations and correlations amongst 
all study variables. The first analysis was an ANOVA predicting self-expressiveness of giving. 
The predictors were the control variables, the main effects of the moral identity activation 
condition and the moral cause condition, and the moral identity activation x moral cause 
interaction. A positive main effect of impression management emerged, F(1, 159) = 12.96, 
p<.01, Partial η2 = .08. We also found a main effect of moral identity activation (activating moral 
identity increased self-expressiveness), F(1, 159) = 18.30, p<.001, Partial η2 = .10, and a main 
effect of the moral cause manipulation (making the cause moral increased self-expressiveness), 
F(1, 159) = 25.89, p<.001, Partial η2 = .14. However, more important to our key predictions, we 
found a moral identity activation x moral cause interaction, F(1, 159) = 4.89, p<.05, Partial η2 = 
.03. Follow-up analyses showed that activating moral identity increased the perceived self-
expressiveness of giving, but only when the cause was moral, F(1, 159) = 22.98, p<.001, Partial 
η2 = .13, rather than non-moral, F(1, 159) = 2.44, n.s. See Figure 1 (left panel). 
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Donation Preferences. We ran an ANOVA predicting donation preferences, using exactly 
the same predictors as in the self-expressiveness analysis. A positive main effect of impression 
management emerged, F(1, 162) = 16.16, p<.001, Partial η2 = .09. We also found a main effect 
of moral identity activation (activating moral identity pushed participants toward time and away 
from nothing), F(1, 162) = 29.87, p<.001, Partial η2 = .16, and a main effect of the moral cause 
manipulation (making the cause moral pushed participants toward time and away from nothing), 
F(1, 162) = 40.40, p<.001, Partial η2 = .20. However, these two effects were qualified by a moral 
identity activation x moral cause interaction, F(1, 162) = 12.69, p<.001, Partial η2 = .07, which 
followed a pattern similar to that for self-expressiveness. Activating moral identity pushed 
participants toward giving time, particularly when the cause was moral, F(1, 162) = 42.17, 
p<.001, Partial η2 = .21, rather than non-moral, F(1, 162) = 1.62, n.s. See Figure 1 (right panel). 
Mediated Moderation. To test if self-expressiveness mediated participants’ donation 
preferences, we used Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt’s (2005) procedure, which updates Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) approach to account for higher order interaction moderator effects. According to 
Muller et al. (2005), establishing mediated moderation requires estimating parameters for three 
regression models shown in Table 2 (referred to as Models 4, 5, and 6 in their terminology). 
Mediated moderation can be concluded when: (a) the first model shows that the moral identity 
activation x moral cause interaction significantly predicts preferences to give time vs. money, (b) 
the second model shows this same significant effect on self-expressiveness, (c) the third model 
shows that the effect of self-expressiveness on preference to give time vs. money is significant, 
and (d) the moral identity activation x moral cause interaction in the third model is reduced in 
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magnitude (or rendered non-significant) compared to the same parameter estimated in the first 
model. Throughout this article, continuous independent variables were mean centered to 
minimize multi-collinearity (Aiken and West 1991). 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 2 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
As Table 2 shows, Muller et al.’s (2005) criteria for mediated moderation were met. Specifically, 
partial mediated moderation emerged, as indicated by the significant mediator in the third model 
and the two-way interaction’s decrease in magnitude from the first to the third model. 
 Mediated Moderation Follow-Up. To better understand this pattern of results, we tested 
for simple mediation at different levels of the moral cause moderator (Muller et al. 2005, 861). 
First, we regressed the control variables and the moral identity activation condition onto self-
expressiveness at each level of the moral cause manipulation. This analysis revealed that 
activating moral identity increased the perceived self-expressiveness of giving in the moral cause 
condition, b = 1.21, t(81) = 5.19, p<.001, but not in the non-moral cause condition, b = 0.46, 
t(75) = 1.44, n.s. We also conducted the same two regressions but with preference to give time 
vs. money (rather than self-expressiveness) as the dependent variable. We found the same pattern 
of results, such that activating moral identity increased preferences to give time vs. money in the 
moral cause condition, b = 3.65, t(81) = 6.25, p<.001, but not in the non-moral cause condition, b 
= 0.87, t(75) = 1.50, n.s. A final analysis examined the simple effect of moral identity activation 
on donation preferences at each level of the moral cause manipulation while controlling for the 
self-expressiveness mediator. We found that the partial mediated moderation effect above is 
driven by a simple partial mediation effect in the moral cause condition: in the moral cause 
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condition, activating moral identity triggers increased self-expressiveness that partially mediates 
an increased preference to give time vs. money. 
Discussion 
This study provides evidence that activating moral identity reduces the aversion to giving 
time, especially to a moral cause of which the beneficiaries are strangers or distant others. It also 
shows that one of the drivers of this reduction in time aversion is that people perceive giving 
time to be more self-expressive, but only when the cause is moral. Therefore, this study suggests 
that people are less time averse when presented with an opportunity to give time to a moral 
cause, especially when their morality identity is activated, and a key reason for this is that they 
see their efforts to be more self-expressive. This is consistent with our premise that giving time 
(especially to a moral cause) is more reinforcing to one’s moral identity—as compared to giving 
money. 
This study on its own provides only tentative, preliminary evidence of the buffering 
effect of moral identity on time aversion and the factors that drive it. While the desire for self-
expression may be one source of motivation that reduces time aversion, there may be others. 
This study provides a promising yet limited glimpse of what these drivers behind this process 
might be. In addition, this study gives little insight into the effect of moral identity on time 
aversion in the face of increasing psychological costs. In this study, participants were asked to 
consider performing a relatively innocuous task (ie. sorting mail) for a subjectively determined 
period of time. Many forms of prosocial giving are far more psychologically demanding than 
this. Therefore, the next study was designed to specifically test the prediction that moral identity 
buffers against time aversion even in the face of psychologically demanding tasks.  
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STUDY 2: A MORAL CUE REDUCES AVERSION TO GIVING TIME WHEN THE 
TASK REQUIRED OF ONE’S TIME IS UNPLEASANT 
Study Overview 
This study’s purpose is to directly manipulate the psychological cost of time. Participants 
were led to believe that giving time involved relatively neutral tasks (e.g., filing papers at a 
hospital) or relatively unpleasant ones (e.g., emptying bedpans at a hospital).  This cost 
manipulation is useful because it may allow people to adjust their perceptions of the costs in a 
motivated fashion. While virtually everyone would agree that emptying bedpans at a hospital is 
unpleasant, people may adjust how pleasant they perceive the task to be depending on their 
ability to resist the aversion to giving such time. For example, someone who is highly motivated 
to give time may reason that volunteering will have some pleasant components, such as 
interacting with hospital patients. In this study, we propose that the presence of a moral cue will 
lessen aversion to giving time, and that participants will perceive giving time as relatively more 
pleasant. Hence, the presence of the moral cue will  
Drawn from a university behavioral lab panel, 238 participants (88 males, 144 females) 
were randomly assigned to a cell in a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 
(Volunteering Time High vs. Low on Unpleasantness) between-subjects design. The study 
consisted of two ostensibly unrelated tasks: the moral identity activation task from Study 2 and a 
donation task. After these and other unrelated studies, participants were debriefed and paid $10. 
Moral Identity Activation 
Moral identity was activated using slide shows. The cover story stated that the task’s 
purpose was to assess the effectiveness of a new software program designed to improve slide 
show quality. Participants were told that they would watch a randomly selected slide show that 
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had been modified using the software. Each slide show contained music, pictures, and quotes. In 
the moral identity activated condition, the pictures featured moral exemplars (e.g., Gandhi) and 
ordinary people helping each other, and the quotes focused on the same ideas as the photos (e.g., 
“Wherever there is a human being, there is a chance for kindness.”). In the moral identity not 
activated condition, the pictures featured ordinary people who were not helping each other (e.g., 
an elderly man), and the quotes focused on human behavior but not on moral behavior (e.g., 
“The search for human behavior is infinite. You’ll never understand it all.”). See Appendix D for 
this manipulation. After the slide show, participants completed manipulation checks and 
unrelated items that bolstered the cover story. 
Donation Task 
 Participants first indicated how much one hour of their time was worth to them in dollars. 
Next, they read about the nonprofit university hospital on campus and imagined they were 
considering contributing to it. Specifically, they saw three options: volunteer one hour of their 
time, donate its equivalent in money (the amount they provided earlier), or do nothing.  
Then participants read a paragraph and saw photographs depicting what they would do if 
they gave time. In the high unpleasantness condition, they learned that volunteering involved 
spoon feeding severely ill patients and replacing dirty urine cups and bedpans. In the low 
unpleasantness condition, they learned that volunteering involved tidying up and putting 
clipboards and chairs in their proper place (See Appendix E for this manipulation). In a pretest 
on a separate sample (N = 68), those exposed to the high (low) unpleasantness condition rated 
volunteering as more (less) unpleasant (MHighUnpleasantness = 3.91, MLowUnpleasantness = 2.88), F(1, 63) 
= 8.18, p<.01. 
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Next, participants indicated their donation preferences for giving time vs. money. They 
were told to consider three options: volunteering for one hour, donating the equivalent of one 
hour in money (the amount they wrote previously when asked how much one hour of time was 
worth to them in dollars), or doing nothing. Participants indicated what they would most likely 
do on a 7-point scale (1 = “I would prefer to volunteer 1 hour of my time,” 4 = “I would be 
indifferent between volunteering 1 hour of my time and donating $___ of my money,” and 7 = “I 
would prefer to donate $___ of my money.”). If they preferred not to donate, they chose a 
separate option at the very bottom of the page that read, “I would prefer NOT to give money or 
time.” We reverse coded the item so that higher numbers corresponded to a higher preference for 
giving time. Also, we restricted the sample to the 210 participants who said they would 
contribute (as opposed to saying they would prefer not to contribute). After making their choice, 
participants were asked to think back to the information they received about volunteering time. 
They then rated how pleasant it would be to volunteer time in that way (1 = Not at all Pleasant, 7 
= Extremely Pleasant). 
Results 
Main Analysis. Table 3 shows means, standard deviations and correlations amongst the 
study’s main variables.  We ran an ANOVA predicting preferences for giving time vs. money. 
The predictors included all relevant control variables from prior studies (age, gender, religious 
participation, slide show quality, and agreement with views promoted in the slide show), the 
moral identity activation condition, the unpleasantness condition, and the moral identity 
activation x unpleasantness interaction. The analysis revealed a main effect of unpleasantness, 
such that participants in the high unpleasantness condition had a lower preference for giving time 
and hence a higher preference for giving money than those in the low unpleasantness condition, 
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F(1, 201) = 50.17, p<.001, Partial η2 = .20. This effect was qualified by the predicted moral 
identity activation x unpleasantness interaction, F(1, 201) = 7.73, p<.01, Partial η2 = .04. When 
volunteering time was high on unpleasantness, activating moral identity increased preferences 
for giving time vs. money, F(1, 201) = 6.74, p<.05, Partial η2 = .03. However, when volunteering 
time was low on unpleasantness, activating moral identity had no effect on preferences for giving 
time vs. money, F(1, 201) = 0.45, n.s. (see Figure 2, left panel).  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Process Evidence. In this study, we also sought process evidence as to how moral identity 
motivates volunteering time, especially when volunteering is unpleasant. Specifically, we 
reasoned that moral identity could motivate volunteering time through its effects on perceived 
task pleasantness. To test this idea, we ran a regression to conduct a mediated moderation 
analysis and found that all of Muller et al.’s (2005) criteria for mediated moderation were 
satisfied. See Table 4. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 4 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Specifically, perceived task pleasantness partially mediates the moral identity activation x 
manipulated unpleasantness interaction. When volunteering time was manipulated to be high on 
unpleasantness (but not when it was manipulated to be low on unpleasantness), activating moral 
identity caused participants to view volunteering time as more pleasant (see Figure 2, right 
panel). This higher perceived pleasantness in turn shifted participants’ preferences away from 
giving money and toward giving time. 
Discussion 
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Study 2 lends further support for the notion that activating moral identity reduces time 
aversion, yet it does so in the face of a specific psychological cost: spending time on expressly 
unpleasant tasks. This study also provides additional process evidence about the factors that 
drive this effect: namely, a decrease in the perceived unpleasantness of the tasks in question. 
Taken together, this study suggests that moral identity reduces time aversion to unpleasant tasks 
because people come to see these tasks as less unpleasant. 
 While this study fosters further evidence in support of the buffering effect of moral 
identity on time aversion and helps shed light on the psychological processes that may drive it, it 
still leaves underdeveloped; our understanding of this effect. Task unpleasantness may be one 
form of psychological cost that drives time aversion, but most prosocial acts are not so 
unpleasant as cleaning dirty bedpans. In the fast paced world of today, a more universally 
applicable cost of prosocial giving is the scarcity of time. In addition, we suspect that at the heart 
of many prosocial acts is the desire to help another person. These issues remained untouched by 
the first two studies. To account for these deficiencies we conducted study 3. 
 
STUDY 3: A MORAL CUE REDUCES AVERSION TO GIVING TIME WHEN TIME IS 
SCARCE BECAUSE TIME CONNECTS THE GIVER TO THE RECEIVER 
Study Overview 
The purpose of this study is to directly manipulate the scarcity of time vs. money in order 
to see its effects on time aversion. We predict that a moral cue will lessen time aversion when 
time is scarce and that this be driven by the extent to which giving time provides the giver an 
expected sense that they feel a connection to the individuals who will receive the aid.  In the 
study, 268 participants (104 males, 162 females, 2 preferred not to answer) were randomly 
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assigned to a cell in a 2 (Moral Identity Activated vs. Not Activated) x 2 (Time Scarce and 
Money Abundant vs. Time Abundant and Money Scarce) between-subjects design. They 
completed a moral identity activation task and an ostensibly unrelated donation task. 
Moral Identity Activation 
We used the same slide show manipulation that we used in study two. Compared to 
participants in the moral identity not activated condition, those in the moral identity activated 
condition reported that the slide show made them reflect more on their morality (MNotActivated = 
3.41, MActivated = 4.61), F(1, 243) = 38.78, p<.001, Partial η2 = .14. 
Donation Task 
 
The second task was purportedly about how college students manage time and money. 
Participants first indicated how much one hour of their time was worth to them in dollars. 
Scarcity Manipulation. Next participants imagined that they were students and that they 
had a certain amount of time and money this semester, with the amounts manipulated depending 
on condition. Those in the time scarce and money abundant (time abundant and money scarce) 
condition learned that they had some but not a lot of spare time (money) and a lot of spare 
money (time). See Appendix F for this manipulation. At the end of the study, participants 
completed manipulation checks. As expected, participants in the time scarce and money 
abundant condition (MSpareTime = 2.80, MSpareMoney = 5.97) reported having less spare time, F(1, 
238) = 270.28, p<.001, Partial η2 = .53, and more spare money, F(1, 238) = 265.97, p<.001, 
Partial η2 = .53, than those in the time abundant and money scarce condition (MSpareTime = 6.08, 
MSpareMoney = 2.55). 
Donation Preferences. After the scarcity manipulation, participants imagined that one 
day during the semester, they were asked to give to the Global Fund, which fights AIDS, 
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tuberculosis, and malaria. The scale used was identical to the scale used in the previous study. 
Because we were interested in preferences for donating time vs. money and not in preferences 
for donating vs. not donating, we excluded participants who said they would not contribute at all, 
leaving 249 participants. For ease of presentation, we reverse coded participants’ time vs. money 
preference such that the higher the number, the higher the preference to give time. 
Expected Connection to Aid Recipients.  Participants indicated their agreement with two 
statements about how connected they would feel to aid recipients if they donated as they 
specified (e.g., “After making this choice, I would feel very connected to the people benefiting 
from Global Fund aid.”) (1 = Completely Disagree, 7 = Completely Agree). The responses were 
averaged (α=.88). See Appendix G for this measure. 
Control Variables. The control variables included all Study 1 control variables as well as 
slide show features that were rated as different across the two moral identity activation 
conditions (photo quality, positive affect, agreement with views promoted in the slide show). 
Results 
 Donation Preferences. Table 5 shows means, standard deviations and correlations 
amongst all study variables. We predicted that those in the moral identity activated condition 
would show evidence of decreased aversion to giving time compared to those in the moral 
identity not activated condition, especially when time was scarce and money was abundant. We 
tested this hypothesis with an ANOVA predicting donation preferences. The predictors were the 
control variables, the moral identity activation condition, the scarcity condition, and the moral 
identity activation x scarcity interaction. We found a marginal main effect of age, such that older 
participants had lower aversion to giving time vs. money than younger ones, F(1, 238) = 2.85, 
p<.10, Partial η2 = .01, and a main effect of scarcity condition, such that participants expressed a 
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lower aversion to giving whichever resource was less scarce, F(1, 238) = 41.05, p<.001, Partial 
η2 = .15. These effects were qualified by a moral identity activation x scarcity interaction, F(1, 
238) = 9.21, p<.01, Partial η2 = .04. When time was scarce and money was abundant, 
participants in the moral identity activated condition expressed lower aversion to giving time 
rather than money more so than participants in the moral identity not activated condition, F(1, 
238) = 8.29, p<.01, Partial η2 = .03. However, aversion to giving time vs. money were similar 
across the moral identity activation conditions when time was abundant and money was scarce, 
F(1, 238) = 0.88, n.s (see Figure 3).  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Connection to Aid Recipients. We predicted that participants who had expressed a lower 
aversion to giving time rather than money would expect to feel more connected to aid recipients, 
particularly when moral identity was activated. To test this hypothesis, we ran a hierarchical 
regression predicting expected connection to aid recipients with the following predictors: (1) the 
control variables (step 1), (2) preference for donating time vs. money, moral identity activation 
condition, and scarcity condition (step 2), and (3) all higher order interactions among the 
variables in step 2 (step 3). We found a main effect of gender, such that women felt more 
connected to aid recipients than men did, b = 0.50, t(233) = 2.65, p<.01, Partial η2 in 
corresponding ANOVA = .03. A main effect of donation preference also emerged, such that 
participants expected more connected to aid recipients as they expressed a lower aversion to 
giving time rather than money, b = 0.31, t(233) = 4.15, p<.001, Partial η2 in corresponding 
ANOVA = .13. This effect was qualified by a donation preference x moral identity activation 
interaction, b = 0.30, t(233) = 2.73, p<.01, Partial η2 in corresponding ANOVA = .03. 
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Following up on the interaction (Aiken and West 1991; Irwin and McClelland 2001), we 
found that participants expected to be connected to aid recipients as the aversion to giving time 
decreased, particularly when moral identity was activated (Moral Identity Activated: b = 0.61, 
t(233) = 7.38, p<.001; Moral Identity Not Activated: b = 0.31, t(233) = 4.15, p<.001). Viewed 
another way, among those who indicated a lower aversion to giving time (one standard deviation 
above the mean on the preference measure), activating moral identity increased the expectation 
of connection to aid recipients, b = 0.83, t(233) = 1.94, p=.054, whereas among those who 
indicated a preference for giving money (one standard deviation below the mean), activating 
moral identity had no effect, b = -0.44, t(233) = -1.34, n.s. (see Figure 4). Thus, activating moral 
identity magnifies the benefits of giving time.  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Discussion 
Study 3 bolsters the evidence that moral identity reduces the aversion to giving time, yet 
it does so in the context of a psychological cost that is almost universally experienced in the 
modern-day world: time scarcity. This study also provides further evidence to highlight the 
motivational forces behind the buffering effect of moral identity on time aversion – in this 
instance by demonstrating that it enhances a perceived connection between moral agents and the 
beneficiaries of their time donations. Taken together, this study suggests that moral identity 
reduces time aversion even in the face of perceived time scarcity, and that a motivating factor 
that drives this effect is the desire for a felt connection between moral agents and the 
beneficiaries of their efforts, even if those beneficiaries are abstract and unspecified. 
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Although study 3 helps clarify the effect of moral identity on time aversion in the context 
of such an important real world cost as time scarcity, the scarcity manipulation in this study was 
admittedly heavy-handed as participants were told to imagine their time to be either very scarce 
of very abundant. In everyday life, there are far more gradients along the time scarcity continuum 
than these two polar extremes, and this study lacks the ability to understand potential nuances of 
time scarcity. Yet beyond any individual limitations of study 3, the ecological validity of all 
three studies so far further suffers in a number of other respects. First, it suffers from the scale 
used to measure the donation preference. In the real world, the choices of giving money or time 
(or neither) to a prosocial cause are often mutually exclusive. That is, people often choose to 
giver either money or time, or neither – not some combination thereof. Second, these decisions 
are made by real people whose moral identities occupy a more or less central place in their 
working self-concepts, regardless of whether or not those identities are situationally activated, 
and the studies so far have paid no attention to moral identity as an individual difference 
variable. Third, all three studies so far have examined expressed behavioral intentions, not actual 
behavior. This is important, as what people say they will do may be starkly different from what 
they actually do – especially when it comes to prosocial behaviors involving real psychological 
costs. Fourth, all three studies so far have asked the participants to assess for themselves in the 
abstract the equivalency between their time and a certain amount of money. In the real world, 
however, people may not have such a finely tuned sense of the value equivalence of time and 
money, so there is some question as to how equivalent their value assessments really were. Fifth, 
none of the studies so far have involved prosocial acts that specifically involved real people; 
rather, they all involved prosocial organizations with individual beneficiaries who are assumed 
and unspecified. This may be particularly important in considering the possibility that a desire 
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for human connection may be driving the effect of moral identity on time aversion. Finally, 
while each of the previous studies measured expected benefits of giving time, none measured the 
actual benefits of doing so. In an attempt to account for all these deficiencies and enhance the 
ecological validity of the research presented in this article, we conducted a fourth study. 
 
STUDY 4: A CHRONICALLY SALIENT MORAL IDENTITY REDUCES THE TIME 
AVERSION EFFECT ON ACTUAL BEHAVIOR ESPECIALLY AS REAL COSTS OF 
TIME INCREASE  
Study Overview 
Study 4 provides a behavioral test of our hypothesis that activating moral identity leads to 
a preference for giving time over donating money, especially when doing so is psychologically 
costly (previously tested in Study 3). It also seeks to extend the findings of Studies 1 and 2 by 
examining the differential psychological benefits of giving money versus time to prosocial 
causes. One-hundred and sixty-three undergraduate business students participated in this study 
for course credit4. Seventy-nine participants were male and their average age was 20.37 years 
(SD = 1.69). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (moral identity 
activated vs. not activated) and given the choice of donating $5 of real money to a charitable 
organization or the equivalent value in time performing a charitable act for an individual aid 
recipient. Two months prior to the study, as part of a class they were required to take, all 
participants completed a pre-questionnaire that included a measure of moral identity centrality as 
well as other surveys unrelated to this study.  
Study 4 used a different method of manipulating psychological cost than our previous 
study. Specifically, participants were asked to donate varying amounts of time as a function of 
how much they perceived their time to be worth at the very moment they were doing the 
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experimental task. Assessing the actual psychological cost of their time at the point of decision is 
important because of the significant implications time constraint can have on moral behavior. 
People may have virtuous intentions in the abstract but when faced with time constraints in the 
real world they can act in a manner that diverges sharply from their otherwise laudable 
intentions. As Darley & Batson (1973) showed, even seminary students who had just recited the 
“Good Samaritan” can be deterred from moral behavior when time is constrained. 
Since time is a scarce and non-renewable resource, we expect that the amount of time 
people are asked to donate would exert a significant effect on their behavior. Simply put, the 
more time people are asked to donate to a charitable cause the less likely they should be to do so. 
Instead, when given the option to donate a sum of money that is equivalent to the value they 
place on their time, they should be more willing to donate that money. However, based on our 
theoretical model and the results of our previous findings, we expect this effect to depend on (a) 
the extent to which their moral identity is activated, and (b) the centrality of their moral identity 
to begin with (Aquino, Reed, Freeman, Lim, & Felps, 2009). In light of the findings from Study 
3 that activating moral identity leads people to less aversion to giving time, we expect the 
perceived cost of their time to counteract this effect. In other words, the simple effect of 
preferring to give money as time becomes costly will be neutralized by activating moral identity. 
Importantly, this will occur regardless of whether or not one’s moral identity is chronically 
accessible. However, we hypothesize that when moral identity is not activated and this identity is 
not salient within an individual’s working self-concept, then the psychological cost of giving 
time will dominate the decision, thereby resulting in a decreased willingness to give time over 
money, especially as the amount of time in question increases. However, if moral identity is 
chronically accessible then even in the absence of moral identity activation people will be as or 
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more willing to give time versus money, even when the cost of time increases. In other words, a 
chronically accessible moral identity in a situation where moral identity is not made salient 
should allow people to overcome the motivation to choose money over time, even as time 
becomes more costly to give.  
Moral Identity Centrality Measure 
 We measured moral identity centrality with the same five items from Aquino and Reed’s 
(2002) measure (see Appendix H) used in Study 4 ( = .80). Again, moral identity was assessed 
two months prior to the time when participants attended the lab to participate in this study. This 
procedure reduced the likelihood that participants’ behavioral choices would be influenced by 
demand characteristics induced by completing the moral identity measure at the same time as 
their donation choice. 
Moral Identity Activation 
 As in Study 1, moral identity was temporarily activated (i.e., made situationally salient) 
using a writing task. The purpose of the task was presented to participants as a way for the 
researchers to “understand how different types of self-image affect the way people tell stories 
about themselves.” The participants received the same list of nine words as in Study 1 and were 
asked to write a brief story in which they described themselves with each word at least once. In 
the control condition the participants were told that the purpose of the task was to “understand 
how people relate to objects in their environment when telling stories about themselves.” They 
received a list of nine common objects (ie. book, chair, desk, etc.) and were asked to write a brief 
story about themselves invoking each object at least once. Upon finishing their story, the 
participants completed a manipulation check in which they expressed their level of agreement 
with various statements about their story (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Results 
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revealed that participants in the moral identity activated (not activated) condition wrote stories 
that made them feel significantly more (less) like moral people (MNotActivated = 4.27, MActivated = 
5.35), F(1, 161) = 32.60, p < .001, Partial 2 = .17.  
Real Donation Request 
After completing the writing task, participants were told that this research was being 
conducted in association with a charitable organization in palliative care that needs two types of 
support: (a) monetary donations; and (b) hand-written cards or letters to its loneliest patients. The 
participants were then randomly assigned one of two photos of patients purported to be in its 
care, together with a description of their life history and medical condition (see Appendix I for 
the patient descriptions). They were told that receiving a hand-written card can greatly lift the 
patient’s spirits and provide them much comfort and solace in their final days. 
The participants were then asked to indicate what hourly wage they would need to be 
paid at that particular moment in time to write a personalized card or letter to the patient. Upon 
entering their required hourly wage, the participants were asked to re-read the moral identity 
activating (non-activating) story they wrote at the beginning of the study. Those in the moral 
identity activation condition were then asked to indicate what their story says about their moral 
character, while those in the non-activation condition were asked to explain what their story says 
about the way they relate to objects in their everyday environment. This procedure was used to 
reinforce the moral identity manipulation just prior to their actual decision.  
Participants were then presented with three options: (a) donate the $5 they would have 
received for participating in the study to the charitable organization; (b) spend $5 worth of their 
time writing a card or letter to the palliative care patient in question; or (c) donate neither the $5 
nor the equivalent amount of time writing to the patient. Those participants who opted either to 
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donate $5 or nothing at all were instructed to continue with the survey. Those who opted to write 
a card or letter, by contrast, were given writing materials and instructed to write their card or 
letter by hand for the appropriate amount of time. This amount of time was calculated 
automatically by the computer, which converted the hourly wage the participants had indicated 
they would need to do the task and embedded the result into the donation choice itself (the 
formula for this automatic conversion was 60 ÷ hourly wage x 5). This made the cost of the time 
donation both salient at and proximal to the point in time when the participants were asked to 
make their donation choice. It also resulted in the generation of a new variable, which we refer to 
as “time cost”. 
Post-Donation Outcome Variables 
As in Study 1, after making their donation choice the participants were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with ten statements about the extent to which their choice was self-
expressive ( = .93). As in Study 2 participants were also asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with four statements about how connected their choice made them feel to the 
palliative care patient ( = .92). The name of the patient the participants were assigned was 
automatically embedded into in each of the four items. Participants were further asked to indicate 
their level of agreement with three statements about the extent to which their choice made them 
happy ( = .96). Finally, the participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 
three statements about the extent to which their choice gave them a sense of meaning ( = .92). 
For all of these statements the participants’ specific donation choice was automatically 
embedded into the statement itself. 
Upon completing the study, participants who had chosen either to write to the palliative 
care patient or donate neither money nor time were given $5 in cash. Only those who had chosen 
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to donate money were not given $5 at the end of the study. After data collection was completed, 
all participants were debriefed and the money they donated was sent to the palliative care 
organization in question. Since participants were informed in the debriefing that the patient they 
wrote to was fictitious, a further $5 was also donated to the palliative care organization on behalf 
of any participant who chose to write a letter so that their efforts to help alleviate the suffering of 
the terminally ill would not be in vain.  
Results 
 Control Variables. As with the previous studies, we controlled for gender, age, and 
religious participation. 
 Donation Preferences. Table 6 shows means, standard deviations and correlations 
amongst all study variables.  Although we presented the participants with three donation options 
(ie. donate money, give time, or neither), since we were primarily interested in the preference to 
donate time versus money, we further excluded from our analysis those who chose to donate 
neither money nor time (N = 15). For all analyses in which donation preference was the 
dependent variable, we only included those participants who had chosen either to (a) donate 
money, or (b) give time. As such, the donation preference variable was dichotomous and we 
coded it accordingly (0 = donate money; 1 = give time). Included among those who chose to give 
time was a number of participants who went above and beyond the call of duty. Having 
completed the writing task, seven participants indicated of their own accord that they would like 
to donate the $5 they had earned to the palliative care organization anyway. After having 
exhausted the maximum allowable amount of time to write letters (as constrained by lab 
availability), a further six participants indicated a desire to return to the lab on another occasion 
to complete their allotted writing time. Four participants indicated a desire to do both. 
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We predicted that activating moral identity leads to a reduction in the tendency to give 
money over time when giving time is psychologically costly, particularly among those with a 
chronically accessible moral identity. In Study 4, psychological cost was operationalized in terms 
of the varying amounts of time that participants were asked to give based on how much they 
valued their time to conduct the task in question just prior to the point of making their donation 
choice. Since time is a non-renewable and fixed resource it is logical to assume that giving up 
more of one’s time is more costly than giving up less. 
Since our dependent variable was dichotomous we tested our three-way interaction 
hypothesis using hierarchical logistic regression. We entered the control variables, main effects, 
and all possible higher order interactions into the model in separate steps so we could assess 
improvement in model fit as a result of adding new predictors at each step. Table 7 shows the 
results of the logistic regression. The results show that the model with the three-way interaction 
fits the data significantly better than the model in Step 2, which does not include the three-way 
interaction (as indicated by a chi-square statistic of the difference between -2 log likelihood of 
each model), 2(1) = 26.26, p < .01. Since the moral identity centrality scores gathered over two 
months prior to the lab study were unavailable for 12 of the participants who had not already 
been eliminated under other criteria, these participants were automatically excluded from this 
model. This, combined with the elimination of those who had chosen to donate neither money 
nor time, reduced the sample size from 139 to 114 for this particular analysis. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
We explored the pattern of the three-way interaction by examining the two-way 
interaction between the amount of time that participants would have to spend on the writing task 
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and moral identity centrality as measured by Aquino and Reed’s (2002) internalization scale. We 
did so for each of the moral identity activated vs. non-activated conditions. We conducted 
separate binary logistic regressions on the preference to donate money or give time. In the moral 
identity activated condition we found no significant main or interaction effects. In contrast, in the 
moral identity non-activated condition we found a main effect of time cost (B = -.49, p < .05). 
More importantly, we found a significant interaction between moral identity centrality and time 
cost (B = .07, p < .05) in this condition. We examined the pattern of the two-way interaction with 
Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS software, which allowed us to identify the incremental effects of the 
model at different levels of time cost and moral identity centrality. As can be seen in Table 8, 
time cost had an increasingly negative effect on the decision to give time as moral identity 
centrality decreased. Only those non-activated participants with the most chronically accessible 
moral identities were indifferent between donating money and time. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 and Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
These results show that those whose moral identities were activated were essentially 
indifferent about the choice of whether to donate money or give time, regardless of their level of 
moral identity centrality or time cost. However, when moral identity was not activated those who 
were low in moral identity centrality were significantly more likely to donate money than give 
time, especially as the cost of giving time increased. As moral identity centrality increased, 
however, participants were not as affected by the cost of giving time. Indeed, they became 
steadily less aversive to giving time – so much so that those at the highest levels of moral 
identity centrality even had a small and very close to statistically significant preference to give 
time even as the cost of doing so increased. 
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Post-Donation Outcome Variables. In this study we also examined several possible 
outcomes of donating time. As can be seen in Table 9, we found that the choice of donating 
money over time significantly enhanced scores across all post-donation outcome variables 
measured. First, the decision to give time as opposed to money made the participants feel that 
their choice had been significantly more self-expressive, b = 0.75, t(119) = 3.38, p < .001. This 
decision explained a significant amount of the variance in self-expression scores, R2 = .25, F(4, 
119) = 11.18, p < .001. Second, the decision to give time as opposed to money made the 
participants feel that they were significantly more connected to the patients, b = 1.81, t(119) = 
8.07, p < .001. This decision accounted for a large amount of the variance in perceived 
connection scores, R2 = .42, F(4, 119) = 23.38, p < .001. Third, giving time instead of money 
made the participants feel significantly happier, b = 0.79, t(119) = 3.28, p < .001. The decision to 
do so explained a moderate amount of the variance in post-donation happiness scores, R2 = .15, 
F(4, 119) = 6.53, p < .001. Finally, donating time rather than money also gave the participants a 
sense that they had done something significantly more meaningful, b = 1.20, t(119) = 5.67, p < 
.001. This decision accounted for a large proportion of the variance in post-donation 
meaningfulness scores, R2 = .33, F(4, 119) = 16.37, p < .001. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 4 support our prediction and qualify the findings of Study 3 by 
showing that activating moral identity does not in-and-of-itself lead to a preference to give time 
over money; rather, it reduces the likelihood that people will prefer to give money over time, 
especially as the cost of giving time increases. What Study 4 also shows is that in the absence of 
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a situationally activated moral identity, chronic accessibility of moral identity can still play a 
similar role in regulating people’s preferences to give money or time. Study 4 further shows that 
for those who opt to give either time or money, giving time leads them to feel significantly 
higher levels of self-expressiveness, social connection, happiness, and meaningfulness. As result, 
Study 4 furnishes direct behavioral evidence that time and money are not psychologically 
equivalent, even though we tried to equate their economic equivalence by heightening 
participants’ awareness of the value of their time.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Giving time to a prosocial cause may have significant benefits, but doing so also confers 
unique and significant psychological costs. As a result, people generally have a significant 
aversion to giving time to strangers or distant others. In light of the psychological benefits of 
giving time to prosocial causes, as well as the socially desirable outcomes thereof, understanding 
the factors that lessen this time aversion is an important and potentially fruitful area of study. We 
have proposed that time aversion may be reduced by considering the extent to which giving time 
may reinforce identity – in particular, moral identity. In studying this issue, this article brings 
together two growing research streams in the social sciences: (a) the time vs. money stream and 
(b) the identity research stream. We build on previous work that has examined the potency of 
moral identity to affect prosocial behavior. For example, prior research has demonstrated that 
moral identity motivates individuals to engage in prosocial behavior when they consider their 
previous prosocial acts (Conway & Peetz, 2012), or when they otherwise engage in immoral 
behavior (Mulder & Aquino, 2013). Moral identity has further been shown to be an important 
factor in motivating volunteerism over money donations (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal & Swartz, 
2013). Finally, moral identity has been shown to be a key factor in motivating high 
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organizational status individuals to report intentions to give time over money to a community 
service organization (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; study 2 page 186). In that study, time was 
assumed to be a particularly costly resource for high organizational status individuals (e.g., 
executives and upper level managers). This suggests that moral identity may have an important 
role to play in motivating costly giving. We extend this body of research by exploring the impact 
of moral identity on reducing time aversion in the face of directly manipulated, increasingly 
onerous psychological costs.  
Our studies have yielded several tentative conclusions. First, exposure to a moral cue 
reduces time aversion toward a prosocial cause, and this is related to an expectation that giving 
time over money is a stronger signal of self-expression (Study 1). Second, exposure to a moral 
cue causes people to view unpleasant volunteering tasks as less unpleasant, thereby leading them 
to report higher intentions to give time to a prosocial cause (Study 2). Third, not only do people 
expect to feel more connected to aid recipients when they think about giving time as compared to 
money, but exposure to a moral cue reduces their time aversion even when they expect their time 
to be scarce (Study 3). Finally, in a test of real behavior we find that the chronic salience of 
moral identity is a factor that reduces time aversion, even and especially as actual costs (scarcity) 
of time increase (Study 4). These findings are consistent with and extend previous research that 
identifies moral identity as an important factor in the self-regulation of pro- and anti-social 
behavior (Aquino et al., 2007; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2005). 
Implications for Time vs. Money Research 
Time vs. money research has touted the benefits of giving time relative to money. 
Compared to activating money, priming time makes people like products more (Mogilner & 
Aaker, 2009), leads people to engage in happiness promoting behaviors (Mogilner, 2010), and 
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boosts charitable giving (Liu & Aaker, 2008). Activating time also fosters interpersonal 
connection by leading people to spend time with loved ones (Mogilner, 2010). Giving time is 
also associated with happiness (Mogilner 2010). Even though giving money has benefits (Dunn 
& Norton, 2013; Dunn, et. al., 2011; Aknin, et. al., 2011), by contrast, making people think about 
money encourages people to be more independent and less reliant on others (Vohs et. al., 2008). 
Thinking about money actually causes people to engage in more immoral behavior (Gino & 
Mogilner, 2013). Our studies complement the existing time vs. money literature, finding that 
individuals who give time feel more connected to aid recipients and derive a greater sense of 
meaning from their actions. That people feel giving time leads to both a felt sense of connection 
and meaning is perhaps not coincidental, as bonding is nurtured by meaningful social interaction, 
which in turn increases social capital (Putnam, 2000). That money is a fungible commodity that 
people are prepared to trade with just about anybody suggests that it may not nurture a felt sense 
of meaningful exchange—even though the act itself helps those who receive the money. 
Therefore, that time is a unique and precious resource about which we are more discerning in our 
expenditures, indicates that it may be tied to a heightened sense of social meaning. Given the 
heightened value people place on their time, we further add to prior research by arguing that 
giving time can have costs that giving money does not, and by showing that even and indeed 
especially as these costs increase moral identity can serve to reduce time aversion (see 
Oyserman, 2009). 
Implications for Identity Research 
 Identity research focuses on identity-based motivation. That is, activating an identity 
motivates people to think, feel, and behave in ways consistent with that identity (Verrochi & 
Williams, 2013; Oyserman, 2009). Moral identity has been shown to be a potent motivator, 
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encouraging people to act in ways that further the welfare of others (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, 
Lim, & Felps, 2009). This article supports that prior work, finding that when the costs of giving 
time are high people need exposure to moral cues – or alternatively a chronically salient moral 
identity – to help them overcome their time aversion. Study 2 suggests that activating moral 
identity may work in part because it changes perceptions of how unpleasant giving time may be. 
In that study, giving time was manipulated to be either low or high on unpleasantness. Compared 
to those whose moral identity had not been activated, those whose moral identity had been 
activated viewed the high unpleasantness task as less unpleasant. This lower perceived 
unpleasantness then drove their self-reported preference to give more time. Study 3 suggests that 
moral identity may further help people overcome time aversion by eliciting an expectation of felt 
connection to the beneficiary of their efforts. In that study, giving time was manipulated to be 
done under conditions of either perceived time scarcity or abundance. Compared to those in the 
control condition those whose moral identity was primed were better able to overcome their time 
aversion. 
This evidence is consistent with recent research on identity and emotion regulation, 
which finds that identities are associated with specific emotions, which people want to match to 
their activated identities (Verrochi & Williams, 2013; Cameron & Payne, 2012). For example, 
activating athletic identity has been shown to motivate individuals to experience anger (so that 
they are pumped up and ready to compete) in a positive light. As a result, they attend more to 
anger inducing stimuli and upregulate this otherwise negative emotion to reverse the “anger 
aversion” tendency (e.g., by choosing angry songs to listen to when they work out (Verrochi & 
Williams 2013, experiment 2, page 210). Moral identity may be motivating a similar form of 
strategic attention deployment in our studies (see Verrochi & Williams, forthcoming; also 
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Reynolds, 2008). For example, as in study 2 whereby participants exposed to a moral cue 
reported less unpleasantness associated with an unpleasant task. These findings present 
intriguing avenues for future research that complement previous work on moral identity and 
emotions (Aquino, McFerran & Laven, 2011) such as empathy and compassion (Cameron & 
Payne, 2012; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt & Keltner 2012; Detert, et. al 2008;)   
We have shown that moral identity reduces the aversion to give time, and to facilitate this 
individuals may either focus on the pleasant aspects of an otherwise unpleasant volunteering task 
or an expectation of a felt connection to the beneficiary of their efforts. The findings of studies 3 
and 4 are consistent with this idea and suggest that people whose moral identities are either 
primed or chronically accessible are not only motivated to give more time, but also feel more 
gratified when they do so. However, the fact that people actually feel more gratified by giving 
time irrespective of their moral identity (study 4) also suggests that doing so may appeal to an 
innate compulsion to give time in order to help others, despite the psychological costs incurred 
by doing so. Therefore, it may be that this effect may be driven by the anticipated sense of self-
expression and connection that those with an activated moral identity feel they will derive from 
giving time. Yet ironically, regardless of what people expect to feel before giving time, our 
studies show that in actuality they experience higher levels of connection, meaning, self-
expression, and happiness when they choose to do so (study 4). 
Implications for Public Charities and Public Policy 
This research has substantive implications for charities seeking donations of time rather 
than money (Aaker, Rudd, & Mogilner, 2011; Mogilner, 2010). For example, asking people how 
much time they will give to charity has been shown to draw their attention to how happy they 
will feel if they contribute. As a result, a “time-ask” effect is created by which they give more of 
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both money and time to charity (Liu & Aaker 2008). In light of our findings concerning the 
motivational power of moral identity in overcoming time aversion, it may be that activating 
moral identity would further magnify this time-ask effect. That is, asking people how much time 
they would like to give may be a particularly potent way of increasing temporal contributions to 
charity when moral identity is activated. In addition to showing that giving time makes people 
happier, our research suggests that giving time – whether hypothetically or in reality – makes 
people feel more self-expressive.  
Our research also suggests that charities need to consider how psychologically costly 
giving time is for their target audience. If giving time is relatively low cost, then one would think 
that virtually all potential donors would opt to give (some) time. However, this research (study 4) 
suggests that while those with a less chronically salient moral identity may be willing to give 
time when the cost of doing so is low, those with a highly central moral identity may be less 
motivated to do so. Conversely, as the cost of giving time rises, those with a less chronically 
salient moral identity become far more aversive to giving time, while those with a highly central 
moral identity become more motivated to do so. Therefore, if charities wish to recruit volunteers 
for low time cost tasks they may be better off targeting individuals with whose moral identities 
occupy a less central role within their self-concept. Conversely, if they wish to recruit volunteers 
for tasks with a high time cost they may do well to target individuals whose moral identities 
occupy a more central role in their self-concept. As such, charities seeking donations of time 
may want to consider moral identity in their promotional materials and distribute those materials 
to the people known to have different levels of chronic moral salience.  
Conclusion 
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Few studies have explored how the tradeoff of both positive (self-expressivity, 
connectedness, meaningfulness and happiness) and negative (unpleasantness, scarcity, etc.) 
psychological outcomes of giving time motivates people to do so even though an easier route 
(giving money) may also be available. The studies in this article contribute to this emerging 
literature. By bridging the gap between the time vs. money and identity research streams, we 
begin to answer the questions of why and when moral identity reduces time aversion in giving 
resources to prosocial causes. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations amongst Independent and Dependent variables 
  
Variable(s) 
     
Independent Variable(s) (α) M s.d. (A) (F) (R) (P) (MI) (MO) (SE) (D)
 Age (A)  23.9 8.0 ---        
 Female (F)    .13** ---       
 Relig (R)  2.41 2.49 .02 -.08 ---      
 Paulus (P)  3.19 .42 .41*** .19** .03 ---     
 MoralID (MI)  .53 .67 -.09 -.04 .00 --- ---    
            Moralorg (MO)  .52 .50 -.07 .04 -.08 .00 .03 ---   
            SelfEx (SE) 
 
 3.78 .50 .12* .11* -.10 .30*** .31*** .36*** ---  
Dependent Variables            
 Donate (D) 
 
 4.21 3.32 .00 .08 -.11* .25** .37*** .41*** .71*** --- 
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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TABLE 2 
Study1: Self Expressiveness Partially Mediates the Joint Effects of Moral Identity Activation and Morality of the Cause on 
Donation Preferences  
 
 Model 4 
(DV: Give Time vs. Money) 
Model 5 
(DV: Self-Expressiveness) 
Model 6 
(DV: Give Time vs. Money) 
Variables B t B t B t 
Age -.023 -.852 .013 .964 -.033 -1.42 
Gender .313 .737 .163 .779 .024 .065 
Religious 
Participation -.071 -.884 -.034 -.871 -.026 -.385 
Impression Mgt 1.84 3.74*** .827 3.41** .812 1.85† 
Moral Identity 
Activation (MI) 
 
.811 1.42 .418 1.50 .323 .658 
Morality of Cause 
(MC) 1.12 1.95* .539 1.92† .574 1.125 
(MI) X (MC) 2.86 3.60*** .899 2.32* 1.49 2.03* 
Self-Expressiveness 
(SE) --- --- --- --- .982 5.72*** 
(MC) X (SE) --- --- --- --- .463 1.74† 
Model R2 .40*** --- .30*** --- .58***  
Note: † p < .10 * p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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TABLE 3: 
 
Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations amongst Independent and Dependent variables 
 
  
Variable(s) 
 
      
Independent Variable(s) (α) M s.d. (a) (f) (r) (prc) (plc) (p) (c)  
 age (a)  20.00 2.10 ---        
 female (f)    .03 ---       
 religionnum (r)  1.24 1.11 .04 -.02 ---      
 primecond (prc)  .47 .50 .02 .02 -.05 ---     
 pleasantcond (plc)  .47 .50 -.11 -.08 -.04 -.04 ---    
            pleasant (p)  3.56 1.86 .12* .17 .10 .06 -.44*** ---   
            
Dependent Variables             
 choice (c) 
 
 3.58 2.57 -.10 .02 -.08 -.01 .38*** -.54*** ---   
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10  
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TABLE 4 
 
Study 2: Perceived Pleasantness of Giving Time Partially Mediates the Joint Effects of Moral Identity Activation and Manipulated 
Unpleasantness on Donation Preferences.  
 
 Model 4 
(DV: Give Time vs. 
Money) 
Model 5 
(DV: Perceived Task 
Pleasantness) 
Model 6 
(DV: Give Time vs. 
Money) 
Variables B           t B t B t 
Age .023 .329 .066 1.250 -.037 -.774 
Gender .264 .864 .315 1.348 -.036 -.170 
Religious Participation .214 1.629 .073 .725 .145 1.592 
Agreement with Views in Slide Show .053 -.272 .069 .461 -.118 -.878 
Slide Show Quality .240 1.901† .264 2.739** -.004 -.047 
Moral Identity Activation (MI) -.326 -.672 -.101 -.272 -.240 -.713 
Manipulated Unpleasantness (MU) -2.902 -7.092*** -2.005 -6.394*** -1.006 -3.234** 
(MI) X (MU) 1.643 2.779** .969 2.139* .720 1.737† 
Perceived Task Pleasantness (TP) --- --- --- --- .903 9.742*** 
(MU) X (TP) --- --- --- --- .076 .611 
Model R2 .28*** --- .29***        --- .66***      --- 
Note: † p < .10 * p < .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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TABLE 5 
 
Study 3: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations amongst Independent and Dependent variables
  
Variable(s) 
     
Independent Variable(s) M s.d. (a) (f) (r) (p) (s) (cf) (c)  
age (a) 21.35 4.38 ---        
female (f)   .05 ---       
religionnum (r) 1.07 1.01 .12** .01 ---      
primecond (p) .47 .50 -.06 .11* .08 ---     
scarcitycond (s) .48 .50 -.04 -.03 -.06 .00 ---    
connectfactor (cf)   .04 .14** .03 .10* .12* ---   
           
           
Dependent Variables           
choice (c) 
 
2.45 2.57 -.07 .05 .06 -.08 -.36*** -.32*** ---  
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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TABLE 6 
 
Study 4: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations amongst Independent and Dependent variables 
   
Variable(s) 
      
Independent Variable(s)  M s.d. (f) (a) (w) (p) (t) (i) (dc)  
 Female (f) .52 .50 ---        
 Age (a) 20.48 1.82 -.10 ---       
 Worship (w) 1.85 1.12 .12 -.06 ---      
 Prime (p) .48 .50 .002 -.13 -.04 ---     
 Time (t) 64.47 91.71 -.06 .06 -.03 .11 ---    
 Internalization (i) 6.09 .82 .15 -.16 -.02 .05 .07 ---   
           
           
Dependent Variables           
Donation Choice (dc) 
 
.50 .50 .18** -.09 .01 -.02 -.09 .11 ---  
Note: ***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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TABLE 7 
 
Study 4 : Logistic Regression Model Estimation Results for Assessing Donating Money vs. Giving Time 
   Step 1               Step 2                  Step 3 
     
Predictor  b Wald 
Chi- 
square 
OR b Wald Chi- 
square 
OR   b Wald 
Chi- 
square 
OR 
Female (F)  .58 (.40) 2.11 1.78 .61 (.41) 2.26 1.84 .61 (.44) 1.93 1.83 
Age (A)  -.07 (.12) .42 .93 -.08 (.12) 0.40 .93 -.20 (.15) 1.96 .82 
Worship   3.41   3.90   6.64†  
Worship (1)  .47 (.54) 0.75 1.59 .50 (.55) 0.84 1.65 .66 (.59) 1.23 1.93 
Worship (2)  -.98 (.68) 2.06 0.38 -1.11 (.70) 2.50 0.33 -1.60 (.76) 4.43* .20 
Worship (3)  .16 (.56) 0.08 1.18 .11 (.57) 0.04 1.12 .29 (.64) 0.20 1.33 
Prime (P)  .15 (.40) 0.14 1.16 4.41 (3.30) 1.79 82.08 -12.57 (6.47) 3.78† 0.00    
Time (T)  -.001 (.002) 0.21 1.00 -.03 (.02) 1.85 0.97 -.60 (.21) 7.79** 0.55    
Internalization (I)  .21 (.25) 0.68 1.23 -.16 (.37) 0.18 1.17 -2.05 (.86) 5.67* 0.13    
P x T     -.002 (.005) 0.18 1.00 .59 (.22) 7.51** 1.81    
P x I     -.66 (.54) 1.51 0.52 1.89 (.99) 3.62† 6.63    
T x I     .005 (.004) 2.00 1.01 .09 (.03) 7.89** 1.01    
P x T x I        -.09 (.03) 7.65** 0.92    
∆R2      0.04   0.14     
Nagelkerke R2   .09   0.13   0.27    
∆-2LL      4.210   14.548    
-2LL   150.501   146.291   131.743    
2   7.50   11.71   26.26**    
Note: N = 114. OR = odds ratio. LL = log-likelihood 
* p <.05. ** p <.01. p < .001. † p < .10. 
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TABLE 8 
 
Study 4: Conditional Effect of Time Cost on Donation Choice at Different Values of 
Moral Identity Centrality for Non-Activation Condition 
 
 
 
Moral Identity Centrality Percentile 
  
 
 
Effect (SE) 
 
 
 
LLCI 
 
 
 
UPCI 
10%  -.157(.068)* -.291 -.023 
25%  -.098(.043)* -.183 -.013 
50%  -.040(.019)* -.077 -.002 
75%  -.005(.007) -.009 .018 
95%  .019(.010)† -.0003 .039 
     
Note: N = 60 
* p < .05.  † p = .054 
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TABLE 9 
 
 Study 4 : Multiple Regression Analysis on Donation Choice 
 
   Self-Expressiveness           Connection                Happiness                 Meaningfulness   
       ß (SE) t                       ß (SE)             t                ß (SE)              t             ß (SE)             t  
Female (F)  .57 (.17) 3.38**   .51 (.23) 2.26* .67 (.24) 2.76** .84 (.21) 3.92***  
Age (A)  -.07 (.05) 1.60    .07 (.06) 1.12 .03 (.07) .43 .06 (.06) 1.06  
Worship  .15 (.07) 2.09*  .34 (.10) 3.48*** .17 (.11) 1.61 .28 (.09) 2.43*  
Donation 
Choice 
 .746 (.17) 4.48***   1.81 (.22) 8.07*** .79 (.24) 3.28*** 1.20 (.21) 5.67*** 
 
 
Adjusted R2  .25    .42   .15  .33     
F    
11.18 
   
23.38***
  
6.53***
  
16.37***
    
df              4                    4           4             4     
N              123                 123      123            123   
 
  
 * p <.05. ** p <.01. *** p < .001.  
 
 
 
  
MORAL IDENTITY AND TIME AVERSION TO PRO-SOCIAL CAUSES                          60 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Study1: Activating Moral Identity Leads to Higher Perceived Self-Expressiveness of Giving and to Higher Self Reported Preference 
for Giving Time when the Cause is Moral 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Study 2: Activating Moral Identity Shifts Peoples’ Preferences Away from Giving Money and Towards Giving Time and Makes 
People Perceive Giving Time as More Pleasant, But Only When Giving Time is Manipulated to be Highly Unpleasant 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Study 3: Activating Moral Identity Causes People to Prefer Giving Time Over Money 
When Time is Scarce  
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FIGURE 4 
 
Study 3: Those Who Express a Preference to Give Time vs. Money Feel More Connected to Aid 
Recipients, Particularly when Moral Identity is Activated  
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FIGURE 5 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Study 1: Writing Task Used to Manipulate Moral Identity Activation 
The purpose of this exercise is to examine people’s handwriting styles as they tell stories. There 
is no right or wrong way of writing, so just relax and write in your natural style. 
 
Listed below are nine words in alphabetical order. 
 
Please take a few moments (about 5-10 seconds per word) to think about what each word means 
to you. Then follow the “Example” and write down each word 4 times in the boxes provided. 
 
Moral Identity Activated 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Example Example Example Example Example 
Caring     
Compassionate     
Fair     
Friendly     
Generous     
Hardworking     
Helpful     
Honest     
Kind     
 
Moral Identity Not Activated 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Example Example Example Example Example 
Carefree     
Compatible     
Favorable     
Generally     
Happy     
Harmless     
Open-Minded     
Polite     
Respectable     
 
Now take a few moments to think about each of these words. In the box below, write a brief 
story about yourself (one or two paragraphs) which uses each of these words at least once. It may 
help if you visualize each word as it is relevant to your life. 
 
MORAL IDENTITY AND TIME AVERSION TO PRO-SOCIAL CAUSES                          66 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Study 1: Moral Cause Manipulation 
 
Moral Cause Condition 
 
The AMA is soliciting help in developing a socially aware grass-roots level community 
campaign (e.g., public service announcements) to raise awareness of the need for college 
students to get involved early in volunteer activities and long-term activist goals (e.g., human 
rights and to help others in need in this country). 
 
Non-Moral Cause Condition 
 
The AMA is soliciting help in developing an advertisement and persuasive communication 
campaign (e.g., magazine ads and billboards) to promote and ultimately sell marketing related 
services to different companies in industry who may require assistance (e.g., to help companies 
gather and organize research, etc.). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Studies 1 and 4:  
Self-Expressiveness, Connectedness and Happiness/Meaningfulness Measures 
 
Participating in this fundraising effort would: 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree 
 
Self-Expressiveness: 
 
Gives me a lot of intrinsic satisfaction 
Feels like it was my voluntary choice 
Feels like it was the right thing to do  
Is deeply involving for me  
Makes me feel good  
Reflects the type of person that I am  
Represents the kind of activity I often think about  
Is an important priority for me  
Represents "who I am"  
Is a natural thing for me to do  
 
Connectedness: 
 
Makes me feel closely connected to the people who will benefit from __. 
Makes me feel like I really understand the people who will benefit from __. 
Makes me feel emotionally tied to the people who will benefit from __. 
Creates a strong bond between me and the people who will benefit from __. 
 
Happiness Meaningfulness: 
 
Volunteering/donating made me happy. 
I felt happy to volunteer/donate. 
I felt happy as I was volunteering/donating. 
Volunteering/donating gave me a sense of meaning. 
I felt that I was doing something meaningful as I was volunteering/donating. 
I felt that I was doing something meaningful at the moment I decided to volunteer/donate. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Studies 2 and 3: Sample Photos from Slide Show Used to Manipulate Moral Identity Activation  
 
 
Moral Identity Activated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moral Identity Not Activated 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Study 2: Unpleasantness of Giving Time Manipulation 
 
Giving Time High on Unpleasantness 
 
If you volunteered time, you would go from one patient bedroom to another, feeding severely ill 
patients and replacing dirty urine cups and bedpans. This means you would spoon feed the 
patients, talking to them, wiping saliva and food from their mouths, and cleaning if they spit up 
or vomit as they were eating. As you fed them, you would try not to stare, even if they had 
highly visible wounds or symptoms of illness. When you were done feeding each patient, you 
would replace his or her dirty bedside urine cups and bedpans with clean ones. You would take 
the dirty ones to a designated area, where hospital staff would clean them. You would spend 1 
hour volunteering for the Hospital in this way. 
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Giving Time Low on Unpleasantness 
 
If you volunteered time, you would go from one patient bedroom to another tidying up and 
putting items in their proper place. For example, doctors sometimes leave patient charts on 
patients’ tables or chairs rather than putting them at the room entrance or at the foot of patients’ 
beds, and visitors sometimes move chairs from one room to another without putting them back. 
You would put these things back where they belong, based on hospital staff’s instructions. If 
patients were awake when you entered their rooms, you would say hello. If they were asleep, 
you would work quietly and try not to disturb them. You would spend 1 hour volunteering for 
the Hospital in this way. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Study 3: Scarcity Manipulation 
 
Time Scarce and Money Abundant 
 
Imagine that you are a student. This semester, you got an on campus job that pays very well. As 
a result, you have a lot of spare money. Also this semester, you are taking hard classes that 
require a lot of studying. As a result, you have some but not a lot of spare time. 
 
Time Abundant and Money Scarce 
 
Imagine that you are a student. This semester, you got an on campus job that pays very poorly. 
As a result, you have some but not a lot of spare money. Also this semester, you are taking easy 
classes that require very little studying. As a result, you have a lot of spare time. 
 
 
APPENDIX G 
 
Study 3: Connection Measure 
 
1 = Completely Disagree, 7 = Completely Agree 
 
1. After making this choice, I would feel very connected to the people benefiting from 
Global Fund aid. 
 
2. After making this choice, I would feel close to the people I was helping. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Study 4: Moral Identity Centrality Measure 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind 
 
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, 
visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person 
would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, 
answer the following questions. 
 
I = Internalization, S = Symbolization, R = Reverse Coded 
 
(I) 1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. 
(I) 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
(S) 3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. 
(I) 4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (R) 
(S) 5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
 
(S) 6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics. 
(I) 7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (R)  
(S) 8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in 
certain organizations. 
 
(S) 9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics. 
 
(I) 10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
 
  
MORAL IDENTITY AND TIME AVERSION TO PRO-SOCIAL CAUSES                          73 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
Study 4: Palliative Care Patient Information 
 
 
 
 
Jim Robinson is 82 years old and lives alone in a small home in Burnaby. Jim was born in 1932 
in Kitimat, a small mining town in northern British Columbia. Jim's father worked in the 
aluminum processing factories. His mother was a housewife. When Jim was 10 years old, his 
mother died of pneumonia. With his father working long hours in the factory, Jim was left as 
primary caretaker for his two younger siblings. After working the aluminum factories for many 
years, Jim moved to Vancouver in 1963 to become a fisherman. Shortly thereafter Jim met the 
love of his life, Maureen. Jim and Maureen were married two years later. They had two children, 
Frank and Jessica. Sadly, Maureen and Jessica were killed in 1974 by a drunk driver. Jim 
continued to raise Frank as a single father. In 1984, however, Frank moved away to go to 
university, leaving Jim all alone. Frank became a chemical engineer and has since worked for oil 
companies all over the world. As a result, Jim has not been able to maintain a close relationship 
with Frank and has never gotten to know his grandchildren. Jim suffered a severe stroke two 
years ago, leaving the left side of his body paralyzed. More recently, Jim was diagnosed with 
colon cancer and given six months to live. While Jim has two good friends, he only receives a 
visit once every few weeks. As Jim deteriorates, he is increasingly reliant on the BCHPCS for 
basic care.  
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John Pritchard is 88 years old and lives alone in a small run-down condominium in Coquitlam. 
John was born an only child in 1927 in Toronto. John's father was a successful stock broker and 
his mother was a housewife. Until 1929 John's family was among the wealthiest in Toronto; 
however, when the market crash of 1929 hit they lost everything. Unable to cope, John's father 
committed suicide, leaving John and his mother to fend for themselves. John's mother moved 
them across the country to British Columbia to work as a labourer in the orchards of the 
Okanagan. Soon thereafter John's mother found a new husband, a real estate agent from 
Vancouver. Instead of getting a new father, however, John got an abusive alcoholic who beat 
him regularly. At the age of 16 John joined the army to get away from his step father. One year 
later, he was sent over to Europe where he stormed the beaches at Normandy. Although he 
survived, he was badly wounded and returned home from the war partially crippled and 
psychologically damaged. Ever since, John has never been able to lead a normal life. He has 
spent much of his adult life dealing with depression, moving in and out of psychiatric wards, on 
and off the streets. When his mother passed away in 1985, John received a small inheritance, 
which he used to buy the condominium he lives in now. John has been suffering from 
Parkinson's disease for many years, and he is now in its final stages. He has no friends and no 
family, and is now completely dependent on the BCHCPS to care for him. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Graham et. al (2012) note that given this complexity, research should account for the extent to 
which a participant being observed would endorse that the behavior being studied on them meets 
that definition. In all our studies, we examine giving time or money to a prosocial cause, two acts 
that are seen as moral behaviors by the samples we study in this article. 
 
2 Research shows that moral character can be a critical component of person perception, in some 
instances more important than emotional characteristics such as “warmth” (Goodwin, Piazza, & 
Rozin, 2014). 
 
3 We conducted a separate out of sample analysis to test whether or not having time = 10, and 
money = 5 changed participants perceived “value” of either resource. Three hundred (N = 330) 
participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Morality of Cause: Low versus High) x 2 (Scale 
Order: Time at High End versus Money at High End) x 2 (Question Order of the Dependent 
Variable: Time Valuation First versus Money Valuation First) between-subjects design. All 
participants answered questions about how much their time (α=.82) and their money (α=.83) 
were worth to them as part of a cover story involving reactions to future measures to be used in a 
study (more details from this analysis are available from the first author). To test whether our 
scale influenced participants’ valuation of time versus money, we conducted a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with valuation of time and valuation of money as the within-subjects repeated measure 
and with the morality of the cause, the scale order, and the question order as between-subjects 
variables. All higher order interactions were included in the analysis. In addition, we controlled 
for the same main effects of age, gender, and religious participation that we controlled for in all 
of the studies reported in this article. If the scale order influenced participants’ valuations of time 
and money, leading them to value time relatively more than money, we would expect to see a 
significant two-way interaction between the within-subjects repeated measure and the scale 
order: participants would value time more than they value money when time is at the high end of 
the scale but would value money more than they value time when money is at the high end of the 
scale. In our analysis, this two-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 327) = 0.41, p = 0.52. 
This evidence shows that our scale most likely did not influence participants’ relative valuation 
of time versus money. Interestingly, it is important to note that these results show that there is 
NO bias of implicit higher valuation for either resource (time nor money) when it is placed at the 
upper end of the continuous scale.  
 
4 Prior to analyzing the data, participants who failed a number of screening criteria were 
eliminated from the data set. The first criterion was whether a participant had spent too little time 
reading the description of the palliative care organization and its role in the study. Pre-screening 
revealed that it was unlikely the participants could fully read and comprehend the description in 
less than 20 seconds. Sixteen participants failed this criterion. The second criterion was whether 
a participant had spent too little time reading the description of the palliative care patient. Pre-
screening revealed that it was unlikely the participants could fully read and comprehend the 
description in less than 30 seconds. Eleven participants failed this criterion. Third was whether a 
participant had failed an attention check randomly embedded in the post-donation follow-up 
questions. Three participants failed this criterion. The final criterion was whether a participant 
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had indicated that he or she had any suspicion about the veracity of the study. In order to assist 
us in probing possible suspicion about the letter-writing task, any participant who opted not to 
donate time was automatically prompted by the survey to explain why they chose not to do so. 
All participants were further asked at the end of the survey to indicate what they thought the 
study was about. Only two participants indicated any suspicion about the veracity of the study. 
After eliminating participants who failed to meet any of our screening criteria, our final sample 
size was 139. While the analyses yield the same conclusions (with even stronger statistical 
support) when we do not exclude any of the participants, we nonetheless opted to exclude them 
in order stay true to our screening criteria, as well as to eliminate as much potential noise from 
our data as possible. 
